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1. INTRODUCTION
Florida Constitutions have always prohibited the state from "tak-
ing" private property without paying just or full compensation to its
owners.1 Presently, Fla. Const. art. 10, § 6(a), often called the "prop-
* B.A., Ohio State University, 1966; J.D., University of Florida, 1969; Partner
with Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler (1970-present); Chairman,
Environmental Law Section of the Florida Bar (1980-81); Member, ABA Standing
Committee On Environmental Law (present).
** B.A., Vanderbilt University, 1971; J.D., University of Virginia, 19,74; Attorney
with Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler (1980-present).
1. Section 14 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution of 1838
provided that "private property shall not be taken, or applied to public use; unless just
compensation be made therefor." FLA. CONSr. of 1838; § 14. Section 14 was repeated
verbatim in the Florida Constitution adopted in 1865. The language was amended in
section 8 of the Florida Constitution of 1868 to provide that "private property [shall
not] be taken without just compensation." FLA. CONST. of 1838, § 8. Section 8 of the
1
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erty clause," provides that "[n]o private property shall be taken except
for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each
owner or secured by deposit in the registry of the court and available to
the owner."'2 Section 6(a) applies to the state, its agencies, and political
Florida Constitution of 1868 was repeated verbatim in section 12 of the Declaration of
Rights of the Florida Constitution of 1885. The constitutional revisions in 1968 relo-
cated the provision from the Declaration of Rights to article X, miscellaneous § 6.
2. Note that the 1968 constitutional revisions changed the requirement from
"just" to "full" compensation. No definitive pronouncement has been made concerning
whether the change has any significance. At least in the context of being compensated
for business losses and attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings, the Supreme
Court of Florida reached the same results under both the Florida Constitution of 1968
requiring "full compensation" and the predecessor constitutions requiring "just com-
pensation." Jamesson v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 322 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1975);
Tosohatchee Game Preserve, Inc. v. Central & S. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 265 So. 2d
681, 684-85 (Fla. 1972); State Rd. Dep't v. Bramlett, 189 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1966). But
see Riverside Military Academy v. Watkins, 19 So. 2d 870, 872 (Fla. 1944). The 1968
constitutional revisions also included a "public purpose" requirement. See Eckert, Ac-
quisition of Development Rights: A Modern Land Use Tool, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV.
347, 353-56 (1968-69).
A prohibition against taking private property without full compensation also exists
in FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 9 (1968). That section provides that "[n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . ." See State Plant
Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401, 407 (Fla. 1959); Lewis K. Liggett Co. v. Amos, 104 Fla.
609, 141 So. 153, 156 (1932); Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979), affid in part rev'd in part sub nom., Graham v. Estuary
Properties, Inc., 1981 Fla. L. Weekly 275 (April 16, 1981).
As a matter of federal constitutional law, the fifth amendment prohibition against
the federal government's "taking" property without "just compensation" applies to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Chicago B. & Q.
R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
FLA. CoNST. art. 16, § 29 (1885) also added a related, but different, provision that
"[n]o private property nor right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any corpora-
tion or individual until full compensation therefor shall be made to the owner, or first
secured to him by deposit of money. . . ." Section 29 applied to private corporations
and individuals rather than to the state, its agencies, and political subdivisions. State
Rd. Dep't v. Bramlett, 189 So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. 1966); Carter v. State Rd. Dep't, 189
So. 2d 793, 795 (Fla. 1966); DeSoto County v. Highsmith, 60 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1952);
Ellison v. State Rd. Dep't, 169 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1964); Daniels v. State Rd. Dep't, 170
So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1964); Hav-A-Tampa Cigar Co. v. Johnson, 149 Fla. 148, 5 So. 2d
433, 438 (1941). Some courts incorrectly applied section 29 to state agencies and sub-
divisions. City of Jacksonville v. Shaffner, 107 Fla. 367, 144 So. 888 (1932); Pinellas
County v. General Tel. Co., 229 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Wilson v.
1 168 Nova Law Journal 5:19811
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subdivisions.3
Florida courts have recognized section 6(a) and its predecessors as
"fundamental" law, "universal" law, and "basic" to American democ-
racy.4 In State Road Department v. Tharp,5 Justice Terrell wrote:
American democracy is a distinct departure from other democracies in
that we place the emphasis on the individual and protect him in his per-
sonal property rights against the State and all other assailants. The State
may condemn his property for public use and pay a just compensation
for it, but it will not be permitted to grab or take it by force and the
doctrine of nonsuability should not be so construed. Forceful taking is
abhorrent to every democratic impulse and alien to our political concepts
.... [W]here the sovereign has a right to condemn for public use, it
will not be permitted to appropriate except by orderly processes."
Section 6(a) is self-executing; it does not require enabling legisla-
tion to be effective.7 The legislature, however, has implemented section
6(a) in chapters 73 and 74 of the Florida Statutes. The statutes are
particularly important "in those matters which are not specifically de-
fined or prohibited" by section 6(a).8
State Rd. Dep't, 201 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Jacksonville Express-
way Auth. v. Bennett, 158 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963); State Rd. Dep't
v. Bramlett, 179 So. 2d 137 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 189
So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1966); Carlann Shores, Inc. v. City of Gulf Breeze, 26 Fla. Supp. 94
(Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. 1966). See State Rd. Dep't v. Chicone, 148 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1962). Those cases must be viewed in light of the Supreme Court of Florida's
earlier unwillingness to determine whether section 29 applied to the state, its agencies,
and political subdivisions. See, e.g., Seban v. Dade County, 102 So. 2d 706, 708 (Fla.
1958); Shavers v. Duval County, 73 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1954); State Rd. Dep't v. Fore-
hand, 56 So. 2d 901, 903 (Fla. 1952).
3. State Rd. Dep't v. Bramlett, 189 So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. 1966); Daniels v. State
Rd. Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1964); Cheshire v. State Rd. Dep't, 186 So. 2d
790, 791 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
4. 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1941).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 870.
7. Flatt v. City of Brooksville, 368 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(citing Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Henry G. Dupree Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 294
(Fla. 1958)); Division of Administration v. Grant Motor Co., 345 So. 2d 843, 845 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
8. Seban v. Dade County, 102 So. 2d 706, 707 (Fla. 1958).
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Although Florida courts will often follow other jurisdictions in
construing provisions similar to section 6(a), 9 the Supreme Court of
Florida has noted that "[wie have our own Constitution and adjudi-
cated cases by this Court which are controlling . ... "-0
If a governmental body "takes" property without formally acquir-
ing it by purchase, eminent domain pursuant to chapters 73 and 74, or
otherwise, the property owner may sue the state, its agencies, or its
political subdivisions in equity on the theory of inverse condemnation."'
As the First District Court of Appeal noted in City of Jacksonville v.
Schumann,'2
inverse condemnation has been defined as the popular description of a
cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value or
property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant,
even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been
attempted by the taking agency . . . . [I]nverse condemnation is a
method of compensation wherein "an owner asserting a claim of appro-
priation of his property may pursue his right by an action in equity for
an injunction, and for damages; the court may then, as an alternative to
the injunction, make an award for the taking . . .-.
The sovereign immunity defense does not protect the government
9. See Belcher v. Florida Power & Light Co., 74 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1954).
10. Adams v. Housing Auth., 60 So. 2d 663, 665 (Fla. 1952).
11. As the Supreme Court of the United States recently noted in United States
v. Clarke, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 1127, 1130 (1980), "[t]he phrase inverse condemna-
tion appears to be one that was coined simply as a shorthand description of the manner
in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when
condemnation proceedings have not been instituted." The term inverse condemnation
has been used in at least sixty-six opinions of the Supreme Court of Florida and the
district courts of appeal. E.g., Stanton v. Morgan, 127 Fla. 34, 172 So. 485 (1937);
Hillsborough County v. Kensett, 107 Fla. 237, 138 So. 400 (1931); Hillsborough
County v. Kensett, 107 Fla. 237, 144 So. 393 (1932); Wilson v. State Rd. Dep't, 201
So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967); City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So.
2d 95 (Fia. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied, 172 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1965).
12. City of Jacksonville, 167 So. 2d 95.
13. Id. at 98. Accord, Kirkpatrick v. City of Jacksonville, 312 So. 2d 487, 488
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Graham v.
Estuary Properties, Inc., 1981 Fla. L. Weekly 275 (April 16, 1981).
4
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from being sued in inverse condemnation.14
The basic policy issue involved in inverse condemnation is simple
enough; it can be framed in one question: Should the individual prop-
erty owner bear the economic cost of government actions or should
those costs be distributed across the taxpaying community? As the
First District Court of Appeal recently noted,
while government clearly has the right to expropriate private property
for purposes beneficial to the general public, it cannot require a single
property owner to bear the cost of such general benefits. This principle,
which is the essence of the property clauses of the United States and
Florida Constitutions, commands that the cost of public benefits be
borne by the public.15
This article will discuss the elements of the prima facie case of
inverse condemnation, possible defenses to an inverse condemnation
claim, and the procedures involved in establishing such a lawsuit. It
will focus on recent developments and issues in Florida and federal case
law. Practice "pointers" have been suggested to aid the attorney who
sues the government in inverse condemnation.
2. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
A. Private Property
Like its predecessors, the 1968 Florida Constitution clearly re-
quires a taking of "private property" in order for a plaintiff to prevail
in an inverse condemnation lawsuit. 16 It is questionable whether section
6(a) forbids the taking of government-owned property, even if the
14. State Rd. Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15, 2 So. 2d 298 (1941); State Rd. Dep't
v. Tharp, 1 So. 2d 868, 869 (Fla. 1941) (Sovereign immunity "will not be permitted as
a City of refuge for a State Agency which appropriates private property before the
value has been fixed and paid."). If a taking has not occurred, sovereign immunity may
bar a suit against the state. Venezia A., Inc. v. Askew, 363 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1978).
15. Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126, 1138 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1979), aff'd in part rev'd in part sub nom., Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc.,
1981 Fla. L. Weekly. Accord, Pitz v. State Rd. Dep't, 32 Fla. Supp. 55, 62 (Fla. 11th
Cir. Ct. 1966); Agins v. City of Tiburon, - U.S. __, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980).
16. FLA. CoNsT. art. 10, § 6(a).
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government holds the property in its proprietary capacity. 17
The property may either be real or personal.18 It may be a fee
simple estate or less than a fee simple estate.19 The method of acquisi-
tion, i.e., by purchase, gift, or even lottery, is immaterial.20
Tangible property, such as sand and shells,21 oil and minerals,22
timber and trees,23 billboards,24 shrubbery and topsoil, 25 are the clear-
est examples of private property. Monies also fit the definition. 6
Private property includes franchises and other contract rights, 7
easements,2 s riparian rights,29 airspace,30 the common law rights for
17. See Myers v. Board of Pub. Assistance, 21 Fla. Supp. 177, 184 (Fla. 13th
Cir. Ct. 1963) (citing City of Key West v. Love, 116 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1959), and City
of Orlando v. Evans, 132 Fla. 609, 182 So. 264 (1938)).
18. Flatt v. City of Brooksville, 368 So. 2d 631, 632 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1979). See Kirkpatrick v. City of Jacksonville, 312 So. 2d 487, 489 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App. 1975).
19. Edwards Dairy, Inc. v. Pasco Water Auth., 378 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); Pitz v. State Rd. Dep't, 32 Fla. Supp. 55, 62 (Fla. llth Cir. Ct. 1966).
20. Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 35 Fla. Supp. 71, 79 (Fla. 11th
Cir. Ct. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 267 So. 2d 633, 639-41 (Fla. 1972).
21. State Rd. Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15, 2 So. 2d 298 (1941).
22. Valls v. Arnold Indus. Inc., 328 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1976).
23. Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1957).
24. City of Ormond Beach v. Lamar-Orlando Outdoor Advertising, 49 Fla.
Supp. 196 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. 1979).
25. Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So. 2d 311, 313 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1960).
26. Venditti-Siravo, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 39 Fla. Supp. 121 (Fla. 17th Cir.
Ct. 1973). See Janis Dev. Corp. v. City of Sunrise, 40 Fla. Supp. 41 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct.
1973); Carlann Shores, Inc. v. City of Gulf Breeze, 26 Fla. Supp. 94 (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct.
1966).
27. Pinellas County v. General Tel. Co., 229 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1969). See North Dade Water Co. v. Florida State Turnpike Auth., 114 So. 2d 458
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
28. City of Jacksonville v. Shaffner, 107 Fla. 367, 144 So. 888 (1932).
29. Kendry v. State Rd. Dep't, 213 So. 2d 23, 28 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968);
Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. R.R. Ry., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491, 507 (1918); Brickell v.
Trammell, 77 Fla. 544, 82 So. 221, 227 (1919).
30. Benitez v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 26 Fla. Supp. 53 (Fla. 13th
Cir. Ct. 1966), aff'd, 200 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 204
So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1967).
6
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hunting and fishing on one's land,$' the difference in water elevation to
operate a millrace,32 rights to "lateral support" for property in its un-
improved condition," ingress and egress,3 4 rights to exclude others
from one's property,3 5 and statutory, common law, permit or contract
rights to develop one's land.36 Section 6(a) protects more than title to
property; it also guards "the right to acquire, use and dispose of [prop-
erty] for lawful purposes."3
Other definitions of private property have included the opportunity
of a regulated utility to earn a fair rate of return on its invested capi-
tal,38 a railroad's expenses in operating certain required services,39 and
the right to use one's property free of an invalid exercise of the police
power.40
If the law does not recognize the interest as a private property
31. Alford v. Finch, 155 So. 2d 790, 793 (Fla. 1963).
32. State Rd. Dep't of Fla. v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868, 869 (1941).
33. See Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865, 868 (Fla. 1956).
34. Anhoco Corp. v. Florida State Turnpike Auth., 116 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1959);
Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865, 868 (Fla. 1956). See Awbrey v. City of
Panama City Beach, 283 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Benerofe v. State
Rd. Dep't, 210 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Meltzer v. Hillsborough
County, 164 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
35. South Dade Farms, Inc. v. B & L Farms Co., 62 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1952).
36. Beck v. Littlefield, 68 So. 2d 889, 890 (Fla. 1953) (dictum that if the city
attempted to preclude construction, "[s]uch an effort would run afoul of the guarantee
of due process."); Griffin v. Sharpe, 65 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 1953); Askew v. Gables-by-
the-Sea, Inc., 333 So. 2d 56, 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
37. Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126, 1138 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (citing Kass v. Lewin, 104 So. 2d 572, 578 (Fla. 1958)), affid in part rev'd
in part sub nom., Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 1981 Fla. L. Weekly 275 (April
16, 1981); Benitez v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 26 Fla. Supp. 53, 65 (Fla.
13th Cir. Ct. 1966), affd, 200 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied,
204 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1967); Pitz v. State Rd. Dep't, 32 Fla. Supp. 55, 58 (Fla. 11th
Cir. Ct. 1966).
38. Gulf Power Co. v. Bevis, 289 So. 2d 401, 403 n.1 (Fla. 1974). See also West-
wood Lake, Inc. v. Dade County, 246 So. 2d 156, 158 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971);
Volusia County Kennel Club v. Florida Racing Comm'n, 4 Fla. Supp. 103 (Fla. 2d Cir.
Ct. 1953).
39. State v. Georgia S. & F. Ry. Co., 139 Fla. 115, 190 So. 527, 531-32 (1939).
40. Pinellas County v. Jasmine Plaza, Inc., 334 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1976) (county ordinance requiring a permit to remove certain trees, but failing to
provide standards for issuing such permits).
1731
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right, there is no constitutional guarantee to "full compensation." As
an example, the rights created by restrictive covenants, or so-called
"negative easements," do not qualify as private property.4' Nor does
Florida recognize a property right to lateral support for improved prop-
erty. 42 And because the unprotected right of a landowner to the "rea-
sonable" use of underground water is merely a qualified right to use, it
cannot form the basis of a claim for inverse condemnation. 3
Florida courts, without elaborating, have refused to define other
interests, such as the loss of profit and business damages, as property
within the meaning of section 6(a)." Loss of profits, when combined
with the taking of a recognized property right, does, however, warrant
compensation under the Florida Constitution."
B. Taking
Like the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, sec-
tion 6(a) of the state constitution requires that compensation be paid
only if property is "taken.""
Florida courts have long noticed that the state constitution, unlike
constitutions in approximately twenty-five other states, mandates com-
pensation only for "taking" or "appropriations" and not for "dam-
ages. 14 7 Without such a taking, the Supreme Court of Florida has
41. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So. 2d 637
(Fla. 1955).
42. Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865, 867 (Fla. 1956).
43. Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 349 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 371 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1979). But see Volls v.
Arnold Indus., Inc., 328 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
44. Jamesson v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 322 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1975) (citing
Backus v. Fort Street Union, 169 U.S. 547 (1898)); Pinellas County v. Austin, 323 So.
2d 6 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
45. FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 6(a).
46. Id.
47. Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 349 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 371 So. 2d 663, 669 (Fla. 1979); Weir v. Palm
Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865, 867 (Fla. 1956); Rabin v. Lake Worth Drainage Dist.,
82 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1955); Board of Pub. Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands,
81 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1955); Kendry v. State Rd. Dep't, 213 So. 2d 23, 29 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1968); Northcutt v. State Rd. Dep't, 209 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1968); Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Dade County, 44 Fla. Supp. 30, 37 (Fla. 1 lth
8
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ruled that "the damages suffered are damnum absque injuria and com-
pensation therefor by a [public agency] cannot be compelled."48
Determinations of a taking are made on a case-by-case basis.49
The distinction between a taking and damages is much clearer in con-
cept than in practice. The Supreme Court of Florida recently has noted
that "[t]here is no settled formula for determining when the valid exer-
cise of police power stops and an impermissible encroachment on pri-
vate property rights begins."'' '1 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
was correct when it noted that the law requiring compensation for tak-
ing and appropriation is "easier to state than [it is] to apply."50 More-
over, as that court observed, "Florida courts have not, over the years,
been in consistent agreement on [what constitutes a taking], particu-
larly where. . . there was no actual entry by the governmental author-
ity on the owner's land.""1 Similarly, the First District Court of Appeal
has commented that Florida courts have found takings where techni-
cally only damage to the property existed.52 The trend to relax the let-
Cir. Ct. 1976).
48. Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865, 867 (Fla. 1956).
49. Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 1981 Fla. L. Weekly 275 (April 16,
1981); South Dade Farms, Inc. v. B & L Farms Co., 62 So. 2d 350, 357 (Fla. 1952);
Pitz v. State Rd. Dep't, 32 Fla. Supp. 55, 59 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 1956).
49.1. 1981 Fla. L. Weekly at 278.
50. Kendry v. State Rd. Dep't, 213 So. 2d 23, 27 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
Commentators also have observed in Florida case law "the absence of a cohesive doc-
trinal basis for judicial decisions, the inconsistency in cases holding 'a taking' or 'not a
taking', and the need for predictive guidelines in this area of law." Haigler, Mclnerny
and Rhodes, The Legislature's Role in the Taking Issue, 4 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3
(1976). Florida courts have not been alone in their inability to establish a useable test.
As the United States Supreme Court has noted, "there is no set formula to determine
where regulation ends and taking begins." Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590, 594 (1962). Accord, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Arvo
Van Alstyne has noted that "judicial efforts to chart a useable test for determining
when police power measures impose constitutionally compensable losses have, on the
whole, been notably unsuccessful. With some exceptions, the decisional law is largely
characterized by confusing and incompatible results, often explained in conclusionary
terminology, circular reasoning, and empty rhetoric." A. Van Alstyne, Taking or Dam-
aging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CALIF. L.
REv. 1, 2 (1971).
51. Jupiter Inlet Corp.'v. Village of Tequesta, 349 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 371 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1979).
52. Department of Transp. v. Burnette, 384 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
9
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ter of the rule, the court explained, reflected "the stresses to which tak-
ing concepts were subjected during years in which sovereign immunity
was regarded as barring more direct judicial remedies for damage by
the State's drainage trespasses and nuisances. ' 3
Despite the existence of an occasional difficult question, much con-
sistency runs throughout Florida case law. Certain governmental ac-
tions will invariably result in the judiciary determining a taking has
occurred. For example, government improvements which cause physical
removal or invasion of a landowner's property on a permanent or peri-
odic, but recurring, basis warrant compensation. 4 A taking also may
consist of an entirely negative physical act, such as the destruction of a
residence, shrubbery, or trees,55 or the "washing away" of plaintiff's
land, rendering it unusable.56 A taking may also occur when land is
1980).
53. Id. at 921.
54. E.g., State Rd. Dep't v. Bramlett, 179 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1965) (installation of streets and canals on plaintiff's land), rev'd on other grounds,
189 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1966); Kendry v. Division of Administration, 366 So. 2d 391 (Fla.
1978) (placing fill on plaintiff's land to raise elevation of roadway); City of Miami v.
Romer, 73 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954) (paving sidewalk on plaintiff's land); City of Miami
Beach v. Belle Isle Apartment Corp., 177 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965)
(public road on defendant's property); Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So. 2d
311 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (placing electrical towers on plaintiff's land held to
be a taking, even though electrical company had pre-existing right to string electrical
transmission lines across plaintiff's land because, inter alia, merely stringing electrical
lines across the land did not preclude certain uses under those lines); Kendry v. State
Rd. Dep't, 213 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (state filled and claimed
bottomlands and flooded certain other lands); Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125
So. 2d 311, 313 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (removal of property such as timber or
top soil from the private premises); State Rd. Dep't v. Darby, 109 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (construction causing clay, sand, and silt to be washed onto plain-
tiff's property held to be a taking over dissenting judge's claim that there was no evi-
dence that the invasion was permanent). A temporary physical invasion is generally
held not to be a taking. Dudley v. Orange County, 137 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1962) (temporary flooding). But see Pitz v. State Rd. Dep't, 32 Fla. Supp. 55
(Fla. 11 th Cir. Ct. 1966).
55. E.g., State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1959); Kirkpatrick v.
City of Jacksonville, 312 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
56. Elliott v. Hernando County, 281 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973);
Pinellas County v. Austin, 323 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (A taking may
occur when a street is vacated, even though it reverts back to adjacent property owners
10
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taxed as municipal land when in fact no actual or potential municipal
use is possible."'
Once beyond these clear-cut cases, Florida courts have used a vari-
ety of factors and tests for determining whether governmental actions
have resulted in a taking of private property. Unfortunately, the courts
have not always applied them in a consistent manner. The Supreme
Court of Florida has recently indicated six non-exclusive factors which
have been considered in determining whether there has been a taking:
(1) whether there has been a physical invasion; (2) the degree of dimi-
nution in value; (3) whether the regulation confers a public benefit or
prevents a public harm; (4) whether the regulation promotes public
health, safety, welfare, and morals; (5) whether the regulation is arbi-
trarily and capriciously applied; and (6) whether the regulation curtails
investment-backed expectations.: 1
SOME FACTORS AND TESTS
Police Power. Florida courts often had indicated that the reasonable
exercise of the state's police powers5 did not constitute a taking of
private property. 9
rather than to the government.). But a tort or trespass does not constitute a constitu-
tional taking. Rabin v. Lake Worth Drainage Dist., 82 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1955).
57. See Bair v. Central & S. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 144 So. 2d 818 (Fla.
1962). See also City of Coral Gables v. State ex rel. Landis, 129 Fla. 834, 177 So.
290, 291 (1937); State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. City of Avon Park, 108 Fla. 641, 149
So. 409, 416 (1933).
57.1. Graham, 1981 Fla. L. Weekly 275.
58. The state has police power to provide for and conserve the public health,
safety, morals, welfare, comfort and general well-being of the public. See, e.g., Hay-A-
Tampa Cigar Co. v. Johnson, 149 Fla. 148, 5 So. 2d 437 (1941). The police power also
may be used to protect aesthetic values. Compare Hay-A-Tampa, 5 So. 2d at 439-40
(Brown, C.J., concurring specially), with Anderson v. Shackleford, 74 Fla. 36, 76 So.
343, 345, Annot., 1918A L. R. A. 139 (1917). See generally Nachwalter, Substantive
Due Process in Florida, 21 U. Miami L. Rev. 99, 118 (1966).
59. See City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 364 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1978); Sara-
sota County v. Barg, 302 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1974); Keating v. State, 173 So. 2d 673, 677
(Fla. 1965); Adams v. Housing Auth., 50 So. 2d 663, 666 (Fla. 1952); City of Miami
v. Romer, 58 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1952); Garvin v. Baker, 59 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1952); Hay-
A-Tampa Cigar Co. v. Johnson, 149 Fla. 148, 5 So. 2d 543 (1941) (sustaining dismis-
sal of complaint alleging that prohibition of advertising signs within so many feet of
177 1Florida Inverse Condemnation Law5:1981
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Even prior to Graham, this principle was not sacrosanct;51 it was
well-established that an overly restrictive exercise of the state's police
power,60 or an "unreasonable" exercise of police power61 may result in
the appropriation of private property. Similarly, exercises of the police
power that are unnecessarily restrictive,6 2 or standardless,63 or arbitrar-
ily applied 4 may give rise to a claim of inverse condemnation.
Like other judicially created tests, the police power test had its
own assortment of problems. Courts frequently disagreed over where
the line should be drawn between a reasonable exercise and an un-
reasonable or overly restrictive exercise of the police power. Further-
more, because of the ease with which one could mechanically apply the
test, courts frequently used it without reasoned analysis. In referring to
the conclusional character of this test, the Third District Court of Ap-
peal in Moviematic Industries Corp. v. Board of County Commission-
ers65 recognized that under certain circumstances even a valid exercise
of the police power may constitute a taking. In Moviematic, the court
found that a rezoning of certain land from heavy industrial use to resi-
dential use was reasonably related to the public health and welfare.66
public highways took property even though plaintiff alleged that the only purpose to
which it could be used was for the maintenance of advertising); John A. Swisher &
Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 149 Fla. 148, 5 So. 2d 441 (1941); Flaxe v. State of Florida Dep't
of Agriculture, 383 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Kirkpatrick v. City of
Jacksonville, 312 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (the city could prove
as an affirmative defense to a taking claim whether, in destroying certain property, it
"acted in the exercise of valid police power"); City of Miami v. Girtman, 104 So. 2d 62
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1958). See also Dutton Phosphate Co. v. Priest, 67 Fla. 370, 65
So. 282 (1914); City of Miami v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364
(1941). Cf. Southern Dade Farms, Inc. v. B & L Farms Co., 62 So. 2d 350, 351 (Fla.
1952).
59.1. 1981 Fla. L. Weekly at 278.
60. Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1979), affid in part rev'd in part sub nom., Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 1981
Fla. L. Weekly 275 (April 16, 1981).
61. Grand Union Co. v. City of Tampa, 23 Fla. Supp. 113 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct.
1963).
62. Field v. City of Miami, 18 Fla. Supp. 179 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 1961).
63. Pinellas County v. Jasmine, 334 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
64. See Mayer v. Dade County, 82 So. 2d 513, 519 (Fla. 1955).
65. 349 So. 2d 667, 670-71 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
66. Id. at 672.
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Under the traditional police power test, such a conclusion should have
ended the court's inquiry; instead, the court asked a second question:
Whether the legitimate exercise of the police power so impaired the use
of the property as to be a compensable appropriation? 7 The court held
that a taking did not occur only because the plaintiff could still use the
property for residential purposes.68 An insufficient "reduction of the
property's market value" 69 did not render the property valueless; conse-
quently, the plaintiff failed to satisfy the second part of the two-part
analysis fashioned by the court.
Laws requiring land developers to dedicate land and to maintain
certain minimal lot sizes and the condition of the development have
been sustained as valid exercises of the police power. In Garvin v.
Baker,7 0 the city refused to approve certain plats or maps of property
which failed to meet the specifications of a local ordinance. The trial
court held the enactment, which required that at least sixty feet of land
be dedicated for streets, sidewalks, and curb purposes and prohibited
the platting of lots less than fifty feet in width and one hundred feet in
depth, was reasonable.7" The Supreme Court of Florida noted that re-
quiring specifications of street widths may prevent "hazardous traffic
conditions," thus involving the "public welfare and safety to a high de-
gree."7 2 Referring to the mandatory minimum lot size, the court wrote:
"the size of lots upon which a one-family, two-family, or four-family,
building may be erected was a subject for police regulation and when
not unreasonable, such regulations do not deprive a person of his prop-
erty without due process of law."73
67. Id. at 670-71.
68. Id. at 670.
69. Id. at 671. In noting that the exercise of the police power may be reasonable
and yet still take property, Moviematic was logically correct. The United States Su-
preme Court later agreed, recognizing that even a valid exercise of the police power
may seriously interfere with private property rights. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, - U.S. -, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978). Accord, Graham 1981 Fla. L. Weekly
275 (April 16, 1981).
70. 59 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1952).
71. Id. at 362.72. Id.
73. Id. at 364-65. Garvin is not a definitive holding. It involved a petition for
mandamus. The Supreme Court of Florida noted that the granting of a writ of manda-
mus was largely discretionary and would be granted only where "[t]he legal right...
13
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In Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County,7 4 the Third District
Court of Appeal sustained a county ordinance requiring dedication of
drainage ways, streams, and rights-of-way as a condition of approval of
a subdivision plat. These dedications, the court held, had a "rational
nexus" to community needs. 5 More recently, the Supreme Court of
Florida upheld the constitutionality of the Marketable Record Title
Act.716 In sustaining the Act's validity, the court wrote in City of
Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co.:17
[D]ue process has never been an absolute prohibition against state
legislation adversely affecting property rights. It has been held over and
over again that general limitations on state actions do not extinguish the
state's police power to enact legislation "reasonably necessary to secure
the health, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the
community."
In determining whether state action violates due process principles,
a court must choose between protecting the individual's guaranteed
rights on one hand, and the welfare of the general public on the other.
This method of determining whether a state meets the requirements of
due process is called the 'balancing of interests' test . ... 8
Environmental restrictions have also been sustained as reasonable
exercises of the police power.79 In Sarasota County v. Barg,80 certain
landowners filed a complaint in circuit court, claiming that the statute
to an order compelling the performance of some particular act [is] clear and com-
plete." Id. at 361.
74. 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
75. Id. at 868.
76. City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 364 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1978) (sustaining
FLA. STAT. § 712.01 (1979)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 444.
79. FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 7 (1968) requires the legislature to make "adequate
provision" by law "for the abatement of air and water pollution and of excessive and
unnecessary noise" to "conserve and protect" Florida's natural resources and beauty.
See Graham, 1981 Fla. L. Weekly 275 (April 16, 1981); Smith v. City of Clearwater,
383 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So.
2d 1062 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
80. 302 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1974).
1 180 Nova Law Journal 5:19811
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss2/3
creating the Manasota Key Conservation District l was unconstitu-
tional. The litigants argued, among other things, that section four of
that law took their property. Among the law's prohibitions are (1) that
no land in the district may be used for commercial or multi-family pur-
poses; and (2) that newer structures within the district may not be con-
structed over two stories high.8 2 The circuit court found the law uncon-
stitutional.8 3 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida sustained the
statute's validity, holding that section four did not violate the due pro-
cess clause.
Section four of the Act does not deprive appellees of their property, or of
the use of their property; it simply regulates the use of that property.
Reasonable restrictions upon the use of property in the interest of the
public health, welfare, morals, and safety are valid exercises of the
State's police power. . . . The restrictions imposed by Section 4 of the
Act are reasonable, in light of the legislative intent-expressed in Sec-
tion 1 of the Act-to preserve the natural beauty of Manasota Key."
Nor does loss of business due to competition with the government
deserve constitutional protection. In Coast Cities Coaches, Inc. v. Dade
County,"5 the county planned to extend its bus service in an area al-
ready worked by a common carrier. Plaintiff claimed that the competi-
tion would reduce its business, eventually causing the company to fail.
The Supreme Court of Florida, citing precedent from the United States
Supreme Court,88 held that "loss of business, through competition with
a governmental agency, is not a taking of property .... ,,87 The court
admitted a taking would have occurred had the county taken the com-
mon carrier's physical property or certificate of necessity; but the
"harsh impacts" to the common carrier were merely "damnum absque
injuria."8''
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 741.
85. 178 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1965).
86. Skaneateles Water Works Co. v. Village of Skaneateles, 184 U.S. 354
(1902).
87. 178 So. 2d at 709.
88. Id. at 710.
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OTHER FACTORS THAT MAY DETERMINE WHETHER A TAKING
HAS OCCURRED
[a] Physical Invasion.
It is well-established that the state may take land without physi-
cally invading it,89 although Florida courts incline to find a taking
where there is a physical encroachment. 90
[b] Deprivation of Beneficial Use.
In order to constitute a taking, some courts indicate that the plain-
tiff must be "deprived of the beneficial use of his property."9 1 Other
cases imply that the landowner must suffer "total" deprivation before
compensation will be paid.92 Florida courts, however, have never de-
fined the word taking to mean a total deprivation. In Graham v. Estu-
ary Properties, the Supreme Court of Florida found there was no tak-
ing in part because the developer could still construct almost 13,000
residential units and commercial facilities; on the other hand, the court
specifically noted that "[w]e do not hold that anytime the state requires
a proposed development to be reduced by half it may do so without
compensation to the owner ...... " In Griffin v. Sharpe,98 the Su-
89. See, e.g., Benitez v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 26 Fla. Supp. 53
(Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. 1966) (a landowner could recover for taking of an aviational ease-
ment even though jets did not fly directly over his property), afJ'd, 200 So. 2d 194 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 204 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1967).
90. City of Miami v. Romer, 58 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1952); Kirkpatrick v. City of
Jacksonville, 312 So. 2d 487, 489-90 (Fla. 1975); Northcutt v. State Rd. Dep't, 209
So. 2d 710, 711-12 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968). See Graham v. Estuary Properties,
Inc., 1981 Fla. L. Weekly 275 (April 16, 1981).
91. City of Miami v. Romer, 58 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 1952) (condemnation of a
ten-foot strip for street purposes not considered a taking because the landowner was
"free to use such strip of land in any lawful manner and for any lawful purpose, except
for the construction of a building thereon").
92. Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Graham, 381 So. 2d 426 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1979), aff'd in part rev'd in part sub nom., Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 1981
Fla. L. Weekly 275 (April 16, 1981); Askew v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 333 So. 2d
56, 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970) ("totally useless"); Zabel v. Pinellas Water &
Navigation Control Auth., 171 So. 2d 376, 381 (Fla. 1965) ("only beneficial use").
The landowner carries the burden of proving the taking. Adams v. County of Dade,
325 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
92.1. 1981 Fla. L. Weekly at 279.
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preme Court of Florida held, inter alia, that a statute extending certain
platted restrictions against any buildings other than apartments and
residences had taken plaintiff's contractual rights to develop his land.
The plaintiff had intended to build a medical office and clinic on his
property. Even though his land retained substantial value despite the
statutory restrictions, the court awarded the plaintiff compensation. 4
In Benitez v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority,95 the Second
District Court of Appeal affirmed a circuit court decision which found
a taking of an aviational easement from certain landowners. Even
though the property retained substantial value, i.e., persons continued
to live on it, the court backed the award of compensation,9"
[c] Systematic Impacts.
Florida courts have also considered the impacts that finding a tak-
ing would have on governmental planning and developing. In Northcutt
v. State Road Department,97 the plaintiffs alleged that the construction
and operation of a highway near them had deprived them of the benefi-
cial use of their property. In particular, the complainants argued that
the highway had caused excessive shock waves, vibrations, and noises in.
their homes. The complaint read that the disturbances impaired the
93. 65 So. 2d 751 (1953).
94. Id. at 751-52. The court, in rejecting the argument that the statute involved
was purely an exercise of the police power, wrote:
This court has long recognized [the principle of the police power], but with the
qualification that there must be present a reasonable use of such power and rea-
sonable limitations thereto, else we let the gates down, as advocated here, and
the whole field of private contract would be invaded and infected to the extent
that security of contract in this respect would be lost and irreparable harm and
damage to the legal, constitutional, and economic facets of what we know as the
business and financial world of the State and the Nation, would inevitably and
necessarily follow.
Id. at 752.
95. 26 Fla. Supp. 53 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. 1966), aff'd, 200 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 204 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1967).
96. Id. at 200. In Pinellas County v. Austin, 323 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1975), the court held that the existence of some access to the property would not pre-
clude the finding of a taking even though it might reduce the amount of recovery.
97. 209 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968). Northcutt was followed in
Travis v. Department of Transp., 333 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
17
Schwenke and Hemke: Florida Inverse Condemnation Law: A Primer for the Litigator
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
184 Nova Law Journal 5:1981
plaintiffs' health and welfare, causing them to become ill and nervous
and depriving them of the maximum use and aesthetic beauty of their
property. The trial judge dismissed the plaintiffs' amended complaint,
which sought injunctive relief, for failure to state a cause of action. In
affirming the dismissal,98 the Third District Court of Appeal made it
clear that the plaintiffs' reliance on City of Jacksonville v. Schumann"
was misplaced. The court wrote: "there is a substantial difference be-
tween the use of an airport by airplanes and the use of highway and
access roads by motor vehicles. The noise intensity factor is different;
the safety factors are different; and the use factors are different." 100
The complaint, however, had alleged that the plaintiffs had been
permanently deprived of the use, benefit, and enjoyment of their prop-
erty.10' The Third District Court of Appeal overlooked these allega-
tions, yet these averments and the inferences which could have been
drawn from them should have been accepted as true in testing the suffi-
ciency of the complaint; instead, the perceived possibility of virtually
unlimited liability appears to have influenced the district court's deci-
sion to dismiss. The court commented:
An airport may be placed at a considerable distance from a city
while it is a public necessity for roads and highways to be built close to,
or directly through a city, and sometimes through its most heavily popu-
lated areas. To sustain the amended complaint of the plaintiffs as suffi-
cient for inverse condemnation would bring to an effective halt the con-
struction, operation and maintenance of access roads and highways
within the State of Florida. It would be impossible to determine and pre-
pare with any degree of accuracy, a reasonable budget for the construc-
tion of highways and access roads in the future in Florida. After the
access roads and highway were constructed and in operation, each indi-
vidual land owner adjacent thereto could seek damages from the state
for a "taking" of their property resulting from the increased noises, dust
and vibrations, coming from the motor vehicles using the adjacent
highway. 02
98. Id.
99. 167 So. 2d 95 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied, 172 So. 2d 597
(Fla. 1965).
100. 209 So. 2d at 711.
101. Id. at 710.
102. Id.
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Notwithstanding the position of the Third District Court of Ap-
peal, the impacts of overflights and the impacts of highway traffic on
the beneficial use of property may be similar. A taking can occur in
both situations. Commentators have rightfully criticized the reasoning
in Northcutt.10 3
[d] Fraud or Abuse of Discretion.
Courts have at times applied improper standards to determine
whether a taking has occurred. In Northcutt v. State Road Depart-
ment,'" the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the state did not condemn
sufficient land for a highway. In spite of the fact that purely legal and
constitutional issues were raised by the complainants, 10 5 the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal focused exclusively on whether a "clear showing"
of fraud or abuse of discretion 0" colored the state's decision to con-
demn. The court, in citing two Florida cases, 107 failed to recognize that
the fraud or abuse of discretion standard is a proper standard only for
determining the propriety of a decision to initiate condemnation pro-
ceedings and not for testing a decision to refrain from initiating those
proceedings. 108
[e] Profit-seeking Activity.
Until recently, single-family residence owners may have had a bet-
ter chance of sustaining a condemnation claim than large-scale devel-
opers. In Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County,109 the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal intimated that a taking will be found more often
in a private setting than in a business setting. The district court, in
103. Little, New Attitudes About Protection for Remains of Florida's Natural
Environment, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 459, 488-91 (1970-71).
104. 209 So. 2d 710.
105. The Northcutts requested the court to order the State Road Department to
institute eminent domain proceedings against their property so that they could recover
compensation for the agency's taking. Id.
106. Id.
107. Broward County Rubbish Contractors Ass'n v. Broward County, 112 So. 2d
898 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Wilton v. St. Johns County, 98 Fla. 26, 123 So. 527
(1929).
108. 209 So. 2d 710.
109. 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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sustaining the constitutionality of a county ordinance requiring a subdi-
vider to dedicate certain rights of way,110 wrote that "[w]hile the [indi-
vidual landowner] may not ordinarily have his property appropriated
without an eminent domain proceeding, the [subdivider] may be re-
quired to dedicate land where the requirement is part of a valid regula-
tory scheme." '111 But the Supreme Court of Florida recently noted that
investment-backed expectations may be a factor in finding a taking.,"
[f] Miscellaneous Considerations.
For a taking to occur, the governmental action must be pursuant
to a plan or program. Damages caused by the commission of a tort do
not in and of themselves constitute a compensable injury. For example,
allegations that an agency sprayed plaintiff's land with a chemical
herbicide, damaging and destroying his crops, do not state a cause of
action under inverse condemnation.11  The recurrence of a tort may be
one factor in favor of finding an appropriation.113
Kirkpatrick v. City of Jacksonville114 presents an interesting study
of the distinctions sometimes made between a taking and damages. In
that case, the complaint contained allegations that the city had de-
stroyed buildings without sufficient proof that these buildings were ad-
versely affecting the health or safety of the public. Holding that a one-
year statute of limitations governing trespass actions was applicable to
the case, the trial court dismissed the complaint."" 5 In explaining the
distinction between a taking and damage, the First District Court of
Appeal wrote:
Compensation to the owner [is] required as to [a taking], but not as to
110. Id.
111. Id. at 868.
111.1. Graham, 1981 Fla. L. Weekly at 279.
112. Rabin v. Lake Worth Drainage Dist., 82 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1955). See White
v. Pinellas County, 185 So. 2d 468, 471 (Fla. 1966) (cutting down trees and shrubs on
plaintiff's land pursuant to a planned program of highway development was a taking).
113. Levinson, Florida Constitutional Law, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 551, 662
(1973-74).
114. 312 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
115. Id.
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[a damage]. The distinction is valid but does not necessarily prohibit
appellants from recovering herein. "Taking" has been defined as "enter-
ing upon private property for more than a momentary period and 'under
the warrant or color of legal authority,' devoting it to public use or
otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a
way as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof."'' 16
As was noted in Graham, Florida courts are likely to consider cer-
tain intangibles in determining the existence of a taking. For example,
where a private person purchases land from the state which can be
used for limited purposes, and then the state restricts those uses, these
actions will be a factor in favor of finding a taking. Conversely, where a
person purchases land knowing that it is subject to certain restrictions,
that knowledge will be a factor against finding an appropriation. 6e.1
C. Owner
The Florida Constitution requires that a person be an "owner" of
property before he may recover for the taking of that property."17 The
owner of a fee simple absolute estate obviously satisfies the ownership
requirement." 8 The holder of a valid leasehold also is an owner within
contemplation of the constitution, regardless of whether he is a tenant
for a term of years,"x9 or a tenant at will, 20 or even a tenant at suffer-
ance.12 ' A vendor under a contract for deed does not possess sufficient
indicia of ownership to be able to assert a claim for inverse condemna-
tion. 22 Only the owner at the time of the taking may sue for inverse
116. Id. at 489 (emphasis in original, citing 12 Fla. Jur. Eminent Domain § 68
(1957)).
116.1. Graham, 1981 Fla. L. Weekly at 279.
117. FLA. CONsT. art. 10, § 6(a). See Dade City v. Simpson, 290 So. 2d 530
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
118. Id.
119. Carter v. State Rd. Dep't, 189 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1966); Statp Rd. Dep't v.
White, 161 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1964).
120. Pensacola Scrap Processors, Inc. v. State Rd. Dep't, 188 So. 2d 38, 41 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
121. Wingert v. Prince, 123 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
122. Florida Dep't Transp. v. Trost Int'l Ltd., 47 Fla. Supp. 175 (Fla. 2d Cir.
Ct. 1978). Trost characterized the vendor's title under an agreement for deed as "a
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condemnation, unless the deed of conveyance specifies otherwise or un-
less there has been an assignment of the cause of action from the owner
at the time of the taking."2 3 Department of Transportation v. Bur-
nette124 provides a good illustration. The plaintiff purchased the land in
1977, approximately eight years after the government's interference
with the property deprived the prior owners of its beneficial use. The
First District Court of Appeal, in reversing the lower court's finding
that the plaintiff's property had been taken, quoted with approval from
the Minnesota case of Brooks Investment Co. v. City of Blooming-
ton.125 In that case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota reasoned that
[w]hen the government interferes with a person's right to possession and
enjoyment of his property to such an extent so as to create a "taking" in
the constitutional sense, a right to compensation vests in the person own-
ing the property at the time of such interference. This right has the sta-
tus of property, is personal to the owner, and does not run with the land
if he should subsequently transfer it without an assignment of such right.
The theory is that where the government interferes with a person's prop-
erty to such a substantial extent, the owner has lost part of his interest in
the real property. Substituted for the property loss is the right to com-
pensation. When the original owner conveys what remains of the realty,
he does not transfer the right to compensation for the portion he has lost
without a separate assignment of such right. If the rule was otherwise,
the original owner of damaged property would suffer a loss and the pur-
chaser of that property would receive a windfall. Presumably, the pur-
chaser will pay the seller only for the real property interest that the
seller possesses at the time of the sale and can transfer.126
The subsequent owner is not, however, without protection. First,
the rationale for the rule enunciated in Burnette lacks persuasion when
the transferor and transferee do not know of the taking at the time of
naked legal title as security for the indebtedness." Id. at 177 (citing Mid-State Invest-
ment Corp. v. O'Steen, 133 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
123. Marianna & B. R. Co. v. Maund, 62 Fla. 538, 56 So. 670 (1911); Depart-
ment of Transp. v. Burnette, 384 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Florida
Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So. 2d 311, 318 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960); State Rd.
Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15, 2 So. 2d 298 (1941).
124. 384 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
125. 305 Minn. 305, 232 N.W.2d 911 (1975).
126. Id. at 315, 232 N.W.2d at 918.
1 188 5:19811
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the conveyance.127 Moreover, the equities in such a case rest with the
plaintiff because the sales price would not reflect the diminution in the
value of the property for the taking, that is, it is the plaintiff who bears
the ultimate burden.1 28
Second, as previously noted, the subsequent owner may sue if he
has received an assignment of the cause of action. In Florida Power
Corp. v. McNeely,12 9 the action which formed the basis of a taking
claim occurred in 1955, one year prior to the purchase of the lot by the
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs in this case were permitted to sue because they had
"bought an assignment of the cause of action [which the earlier owner]
had against the defendant. 130
Third, the subsequent owner may have remedies other than a suit
in inverse condemnation. He may seek to enjoin the state from continu-
ing its conduct. In Burnette, although the plaintiff was unsuccessful in
making out a case for inverse condemnation, he nevertheless succeeded
in enjoining the state from continuing to burden his land. 31 The court,
in answering the defendant's argument that the plaintiff was not the
proper party to assert ownership, stated that "[i]t is no defense to this
action, so conceived, that the drainage system was already in place
when Burnette bought this acreage and so 'came to the nuisance.' 182
Of equal interest was the court's intimation that it may be necessary to
the state to use its eminent domain powers should the tort continue.
Quite possibly the Department is unable to restore the old northwest
drainage pattern without casting unmanageable water on North Florida
Junior College. Condemnation of some land or easements may be appro-
priate to manage this drainage and compliance with the injunction, but
127. In Burnette, Judge Booth wrote: "the rule [holding that the owner of the
property at the time of the taking is entitled to compensation] does not apply in inverse
condemnation proceedings in the absence of a showing that the plaintiff and his prede-
cessor in title were aware of the existence of a cause of action at the time title was
transferred." 384 So. 2d at 924 (citing Cox Enterprises v. Phillips Petroleum, 550 P.2d
1324 (Okla. 1976)).
128. Id. at 924-25.
129. 125 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
130. Id. at 313.
131. 384 So. 2d 916.
132. Id. at 922 (citing Lawrence v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 81 So. 2d 632, 634
(Fla. 1955)).
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the manner and method of so relieving [plaintiff's] land are for the De-
partment to determine in the exercise of its lawful powers.'33
Regardless of whether the subsequent purchaser acquires an as-
signment or sues in tort, his conduct should be beyond reproach be-
cause courts hesitate to provide a remedy if they find that the pur-
chaser did not buy in good faith, but rather for "the sole purpose of
[instituting] a vexatious lawsuit."13
D. Public Purpose
The Florida Constitution specifically provides that no property
may be taken except for a "public purpose" without full compensa-
tion.1 " The requirement of a public purpose limits the government's
right to take and may not be used defensively by the state in an inverse
condemnation proceeding. 3" In Kirkpatrick v. City of Jacksonville,"'7
the city argued that the plaintiff was not entitled to compensation be-
cause the government did not have a public purpose for destroying his
building. The First District Court of Appeal rejected the city's argu-
ment because the constitutional requirement that private property be
taken only for public purpose serves to protect the landowner, and not
the municipality.38 The state may avoid altogether the issue of
whether a public purpose exists if it can prove that the damage stems
from an isolated trespass or tort rather than from a planned govern-
mental program.139
133. Id. at 923.
134. Id. at 922 (quoting Prosser, LAW OF TORTS 611 (4th ed. 1971)).
135. FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 6(a).
136. See, e.g., Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975);
City of Lakeland v. Bunch, 293 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1974); Demeter Land Co. v. Florida
Pub. Serv. Co., 99 Fla. 954, 128 So. 402 (1930); Brest v. Jacksonville Expressway
Auth., 194 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), affid, 202 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1967).
What constitutes a "public purpose" may be broad. See, e.g., Deseret Ranches of
Florida, Inc. v. Bowman, 349 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1977); Stein v. Darby, 126 So. 2d 313
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
137. 312 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
138. Id.
139. See White v. Pinellas County, 185 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1966). In Kirkpatrick,
312 So. 2d 487, the First District Court of Appeal misconstrued White. White held
that a plaintiff would prevail in inverse condemnation only if governmental action was
24
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E. Full Compensation
If a plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case of inverse
condemnation, the Florida Constitution demands that "full compensa-
tion [be] paid to each owner.1 140 The public body is liable to the same
extent in an inverse condemnation proceeding as it is in a direct con-
demnation proceeding.1'4 The award of compensation seeks to make
the property owner "whole so far as is possible and practicable."'142 The
constitutional provision does not seek to put the owner in a better posi-
tion than he would have been in if there had been no taking."3
Full compensation generally means the fair market value of the
property taken.' 4 If less than the complete parcel is taken, severance
damages should be awarded for the remainder of the parcel. 45 The
government bears the burden of proving the value of the property; the
property owner has the burden of proving damage to the remainder of
pursuant to a valid government program.
140. FLA. CONST. art 10, § 6(a).
141. Flatt v. City of Brooksville, 368 So. 2d 631, 632 n.1 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (citing State Rd. Dep't v. Lewis, 190 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1966)).
See Division of Administration v. West Palm Beach Garden Club, 352 So. 2d 1177,
1180 n.3 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
142. Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 35 Fla. Supp. 71, 73 (Fla. l1th
Cir. Ct. 1971) (citing Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602, 604 (Fla. 1950)), rev'd
on other grounds, 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972). Accord, Division of Bond Fin. v. Rainey,
275 So. 2d 551, 554 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Cheshire v. State Rd. Dep't, 186
So. 2d 790, 791 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Ben-
nett, 158 So. 2d 821, 827 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964) ("the guiding light . . . is to
secure to the owner of the property taken full compensation - to make him whole -
nothing less, nothing more").
143. See Shavers v. Duval County, 73 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1954).
144. Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972)
(stating that the property might have been acquired for less than fair market value is
immaterial).
145. Kendry v. Division of Administration, 366 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1978); Daniels
v. State Rd. Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1964); City of Hollywood v. Jarkesy, 343 So.
2d 886 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). But see Stanton v. Morgan, 127 Fla. 34, 172 So.
485 (1937) (government liable for property taken but not for tort damages to other
property). If the taking directly enhances the value of the remaining parcel, the en-
hancement may be offset against the severance damages. Limmiatis v. Canal Auth.,
253 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
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his property. 146 Once a taking has occurred, the landowner may recover
for consequential damages to the remainder of his parcel.147 Fair mar-
ket value may be insufficient in certain circumstances. 4 , Full compen-
sation may at times require replacement value. 49 Any evaluation
methods serve merely as tools in ascertaining full compensation.1 50 If
the court determines a taking has occurred, it may order the state to
pay compensation. Some courts will give the state the option of discon-
tinuing its action; other courts will enjoin the state from
appropriating.151
The Florida Legislature occasionally has tried to establish artificial
limits on the amount of compensation for a governmental taking.15 2
Courts generally exhibit an antipathy towards these ceilings, occasion-
ally striking them down as unconstitutional in violation of the full com-
pensation requirement and of the separation of powers mandate in the
Florida Constitution.15" Despite their negative reception, legislative de-
terminations of full compensation, "while not conclusive or binding, are
persuasive and will be upheld unless clearly contrary to the judicial
146. Kendry, 366 So. 2d 391. See City of Fort Lauderdale v. Casino Realty,
Inc., 313 So. 2d 649, 652 (Fla. 1975) (Overton, J., concurring).
147. Kendry, 366 So. 2d 391; Division of Administration v. Grant Motor Co.,
345 So. 2d 843, 845 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Glessner v. Duval County, 203 So.
2d 330, 334 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Dean v. State Rd. Dep't, 165 So. 2d 257
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Benitez v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 26 Fla.
Supp. 53, 64 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. 1966), affd, 200 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1967). But see Division of Administration v. West Palm Beach Garden Club, 352 So.
2d 1177 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
148. Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972)
(citing Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Henry J. Dupree Co., 108 So. 2d 289 (Fla.
1959)). But see State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1959).
149. State Rd. Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15, 2 So. 2d 298 (1941). See Rice v.
City of Fort Lauderdale, 281 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973). But see Hill v.
Marion County, 238 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
150. Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972);
Division of Bond Fin. of the Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Rainey, 275 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
151. Mayer v. Dade County, 82 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1955); City of Ormond Beach
v. Lamar-Orlando Outdoor Advertising, 49 Fla. Supp. 196 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. 1979);
Field v. City of Miami, 18 Fla. Supp. 179 (Fla. llth Cir. Ct. 1961).
152. Daniels v. State Rd. Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1964).
153. Id.
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view of the matter." 1 4
The jury takes its directions from the trial judge in determining
the amount of money which should be awarded an injured plaintiff.155
The jury may not make an independent determination of the value of
the property, but may evaluate, interpret, and weigh expert testi-
mony.156 In Behm v. Division of Administration,1 57 the Supreme Court
of Florida made it clear that "compensation . . .is by our constitultion
committed for final determination to the jury, not to an expert."1 58
Three limitations still exist to check the principle enunciated in Behm.
First, substantial evidence must support the jury determination.159 Sec-
ond, the jury verdict must be at least equal to the state's admission of
damages. g10 Third, the judge may grant a new trial if the verdict
"shocks" him by being contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence,
even where the jury returns a verdict within the range of testified
values."'1
Florida law grants reasonable attorney's fees in inverse condemna-
tion and eminent domain proceedings.6 2 In State Road Department v.
Lewis,16 3 the government argued that an award of attorney's fees was
improper in an inverse condemnation action. The First District Court
154. Id. at 853.
155. State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1959) (citing Spafford v.
Brevard County, 92 Fla. 617, 110 So. 451 (1926)). Accord, Behm v. Division of Ad-
ministration, 383 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1980); Daniels v. State Rd. Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846
(Fla. 1964); State ex rel. State Rd. Dep't v. Wingfield, 101 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1958); Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 35 Fla. Supp. 71 (Fla.
11 th Cir. Ct. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972); Pitz v. State
Rd. Dep't, 32 Fla. Supp. 55 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 1966).
156. Behm v. Division of Administration, 326 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1976).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 582.
159. Meyers v. City of Daytona Beach, 158 Fla. 859, 30 So. 354 (1947); Bain-
bridge v. State Rd. Dep't, 139 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
160. Meyers, 158 Fla. 859, 30 So. 354.
161. Bennett v. Jacksonville Expressway Auth., 131 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1961).
162. FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (1979). Askew v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 333 So. 2d
56 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976); State Rd. Dep't v. Bender, 190 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Dratch v. Dade County, 105 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1958).
163. 190 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
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of Appeal called the state's argument "absurd." 64
[W]e find [the state's] position to be that if [the state] complies with the
law of this State by instituting an eminent domain action, it is liable for
attorneys' fees; but if it unlawfully appropriated a citizen's property
without instituting such an action, it thus escapes liability for the attor-
neys' fees incurred by the aggrieved owner. The absurdity of this argu-
ment disposes of this point contra to the [state's] contention., 5
The services performed by attorneys and experts in attempting to
obtain federal relocation payments have been held not to be
compensable.1 66
Attorneys may receive sizeable amounts in inverse condemnation
cases. In State of Florida v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 1 7 the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal rejected the state's argument that fees must be
calculated upon a time and hourly-rate basis. The court noted that
"[i]n an inverse condemnation proceeding, attorneys' fees must be
viewed as entirely contingent until a 'taking' is judicially deter-
mined." 168 Rejecting the contention that $850,000 in attorney's fees for
legal services over a five-year period was excessive, the district court
cited to a number of factors which are permissible in establishing the
propriety of a fee: the benefit to the client, the novelty, difficulty, and
importance of the questions involved, and the attorney's skill and talent
may all influence the amount of the award given.'6 9
Expert witnesses must testify at trial concerning the value of ser-
164. Id. at 600.
165. Id. Because attorney's fees in an inverse condemnation proceeding remain
contingent until a taking has been determined and the proceeding itself is more com-
plex than in eminent domain, the fees should be substantially greater than in a suit for
eminent domain. See generally cases cited notes 167-69 infra.
166. Division of Administration v. Grant Motor Co., 345 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
167. 374 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1203
(Fla. 1980).
168. Id. at 584.
169. Id. The court used in part the factors outlined in the Code of Professional
Responsibility and in FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (1977) as guidelines for determining the
appropriate fee. As one expert testified in the litigation, "the skill required" to prevail
in this complex case was "ten" on a one-to-ten scale. Id.
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vices performed by the attorney.1 70 One should also keep accurate
records of time and expenses. 7
Full compensation also includes interest on the value of the prop-
erty taken from the time of its appropriation . 7 A property owner may
also recover his costs. 7 3 These include reasonable and necessary ex-
penses for appraisers and expert witnesses, at least when the testimony
relates directly to the establishment of the prima facie case.274
Business losses are not compensable injuries under section 6(a).
Arguably, a plaintiff suffers just as much when he loses the goodwill of
his trade and future income as he does when he must relinquish a fee
simple interest.'" But Florida courts have adhered rigidly to the gen-
eral rule that the proprietor lacks a complete remedy. Several ratio-
170. Lyle v. Lyle, 167 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (involving a
dissolution of marriage action); Central & S. Fla. Flood Control Dist. v. Scott, 30 Fla.
Supp. 37 (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. 1968); Division of Administration v. Condominium Int'l,
317 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Breitbort v. State Rd. Dep't, 116 So. 2d
458 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959). Reasonable fees for obtaining those experts' testi-
mony also may be recovered. Central & S. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 30 Fla. Supp. 37.
The attorney may also testify concerning the value of his services, and the jury award
may not exceed that value. State v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 374 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
171. City of Miami Beach v. Manilow, 253 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1971); Division of Administration v. Condominium Int'l, 317 So. 2d at 812 n.2. See
State v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 374 So. 582 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
172. State Rd. Dep't v. Lewis, 190 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1966);
FLA. STAT. § 74.091 (1979).
173. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (1979); State Rd. Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15, 2 So.
2d 298 (1941). But see Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 101 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1958).
174. Florida Coast Ry. Co. v. Martin County, 171 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1965); Dade
County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1950); City of Miami Beach v. Manilow, 253
So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Cheshire v. State Rd. Dep't, 186 So. 2d 790
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966); City of Miami Beach v. Belle Isle Apartment Corp.,
177 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (expert witness fees part of costs). But
see Inland Waterway Dev. Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 38 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1948).
175. Behm v. Division of Administration, 383 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1980); Division of
Administration v. Grant Motor Co., 345 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
State Rd. Dep't v. Abel Inv. Co., 165 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964). See
City of Tampa v. Texas Co., 107 So. 2d 216, 225 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970). Where
an interest of less duration than a fee is taken, the value of that interest has been held
to be the loss in rental income. Pitz v. State Rd. Dep't, 32 Fla. Supp. 55 (Fla. 11th Cir.
Ct. 1966).
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nales have been offered, none compelling. For the most part, courts fear
that permitting recovery in a commercial setting would expand the
scope of liability to unmanagable limits. 17 As a final argument, the
state may claim that because the proprietor can relocate and continue
his business elsewhere, he never suffers a true loss. 177
Although business losses themselves rarely constitute compensable
injuries, the value of the property to be condemned may reflect the
property's earning potential.' 7 8 The court, in calculating the size of an
award, considers all those items in which a "willing buyer" would be
interested if he were "purchasing the entire package.' 9 Thus, factors
such as past investments and projected future income influence the
amount of compensation awarded.
Relief may also exist by statute; one in particular authorizes re-
covery for certain types of business losses under limited circum-
stances. 80 As one court has noted "the right to business damages is a
matter of legislative grace . . ... ,81 It follows, then, that in order to
receive an award under this enactment, the injured businessman bears
the burden of proving his entitlement."i 2 And he may not use this stat-
ute for a "second recovery" of severance damages: "such a result, upon
principles of justice and fair play, should not be allowed.' ' 3
176. See, e.g., State Rd. Dep't v. Bramlett, 189 So. 2d 481, 483-84 (Fla. 1966)
("[W]e think we would be less than cautious and far from practical if we were to
sanction what could well lead to a stampede into the field of damages in eminent do-
main proceedings. Allowing [business damages] could start the rush. We would hold
the line."). See also Northcutt v. State Rd. Dep't of Fla., 209 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1968).
177. Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972).
178. Division of Bond Fin. of the Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Rainey, 275 So. 2d 551
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
179. Id. at 554.
180. FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1979).
181. Tuttle v. Division of Administration, 327 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1976), aff'd, 336 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1976).
182. City of Fort Lauderdale v. Casino Realty, Inc., 313 So. 2d 649, 654 (Fa.
1975) (Overton, J., concurring).
183. Glessner v. Duval County, 203 So. 2d 330, 335 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1967).
1 196 5:1981 1
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3. DEFENSES
First, the state may claim that it has merely committed a trespass
or other tort. Such an allegation, if successfully maintained, is fatal to
a suit for inverse condemnation.
Second, the state may claim that it did not take property but
merely exercised its police power."" The First District Court of Appeal
has suggested that the state has the burden of proving as an affirmative
defense the proper exercise of its police power.185
A defense may exist if the landowner gave the property interest to
the state or otherwise "consented" or "acquiesced" to the taking.186
Similarly, if the taking conferred a privilege to the owner, the state
may use this reciprocal exchange as a defense.1 87 Prescription, laches,
and dedication may also be asserted by the state,1 88 although the one-
year statute of limitations for tort actions does not apply to an equita-
ble action in inverse condemnation. 89 An estoppel can, according to at
least one court, prevent a private property owner from asserting that a
taking has occurred.1 90
184. FLA. CONST. art 10, § 6(a).
185. Kirkpatrick v. City of Jacksonville, 312 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1975).
186. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Rader, 306 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1975). Compare Alford v. Finch, 155 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1963), with City of Coral
Gables v. State ex rel. Landis, 129 Fla. 834, 177 So. 290 (1937). Because a taking
consists of an entry and appropriation, consent to entry will not in and of itself consti-
tute a defense to suit. Edwards Dairy, Inc. v. Pasco Water Auth., Inc., 348 So. 2d 866
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
187. See State v. Georgia S. & F. Ry. Co., 139 Fla. 115, 190 So. 527 (1938).
188. Smith v. City of Melbourne, 211 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
Benitez v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 26 Fla. Supp. 53 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct.
1966), aff'd, 200 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 204 So. 2d 328
(Fla. 1967). See Delaney v. Department of Transp., 306 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1975).
189. Hillsborough County v. Kensett, 107 Fla. 237, 144 So. 383 (1932). But see
Benitez, 200 So. 2d 194.
190. Compare Division of Administration v. West Palm Beach Garden Club, 352
So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977), with Mayer v. Dade County, 82 So. 2d 513
(Fla. 1955). See also City of Miami v. Romer, 73 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954).
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4. PROCEDURES
In general, the judge determines whether governmental action has
resulted in a taking.'"" If compensation is to be awarded, the judge
should order the state to institute condemnation proceedings. 192 At
these proceedings, the jury determines the extent of the appropriation
and the amount of damages.9 3 The Florida Administrative Procedure
Act cannot, consistent with the state constitution, relegate questions
concerning a taking to administrative determination.9 4 Finally, the
court, as part of its inherent power to enforce judgments and pursuant
to the constitution, may order the agency to issue the necessary author-
ization to the state treasurer to pay the award, at least in those situa-
tions in which funds are available.195
5. PRACTICE POINTERS
In preparing an inverse condemnation lawsuit, the attorney should
not overlook other federal and state constitutional guarantees. Govern-
ment action may violate the due process or equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Other
obvious challenges also exist. For example, in State ex reL Furman v.
Searey,'98 the Fourth District Court of Appeal invalidated permit re-
191. Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1979), aff'd in part revd in part sub nom., Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 1981
Fla. L. Weekly 275 (April 16, 1981). Sarasota - Manatee Airport Auth. v. Alderman,
238 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
192. State Rd. Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15, 2 So. 2d 298 (1941); Florida Power
Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (citing Broward
County v. Douldin, 114 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959) and State Rd. Dep't
v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868 (1941)); Askew v. Gables-By-The-Sea, 333 So. 2d
56 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
193. FLA. STAT. § 73.10 (1979). Flatt v. City of Brooksville, 368 So. 2d 631
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). But there is no constitutional right to a jury determina-
tion. See Carter v. State Rd. Dep't, 189 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1966).
194. Department of Rev. v. Young American Builders, Inc., 330 So. 2d 864 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976); State v. State, 326 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976);
FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 3.
195. State Rd. Dep't v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 166 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
196. 225 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
1 198 Nova Law Journal 5:1981 1
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quirements on a substantive due process ground. Ordinances have also
fallen to vagueness and overbreadth challenges. 1 7
Both the Florida and the United States Constitutions may be re-
lied upon by the property owner. Because no election problem exists,
the attorney should attempt to base his claim on both constitutional
guarantees. If federal case law gives less protection to his client, the
attorney may still prove his case under the Florida Constitution.9 8
Courts should hesitate before granting summary judgment in an
inverse condemnation action.199 Authority exists for the proposition
that all doubts should be resolved against the state.20 0 As with other
cases, legally competent, substantial evidence must support the plain-
tiff's prima facie case. 20 1 The attorney should exhaust his available ad-
ministrative remedies.0 2
197. Admiral Dev. Corp. v. City of Maitland, 338 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1972).
198. See Little, New Attitudes About Legal Protection for Remains of Florida's
Natural Environment, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 459 (1970-71).
199. Wilson v. State Rd. Dep't, 201 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
200. Alford v. Finch, 155 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1963); Benitez, 26 Fla. Supp. 53
(citing Alford), aff'd, 200 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 204
So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1967).
201. Walters v. State Rd. Dep't, 239 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
202. See Kasser v. Dade County, 344 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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